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Abstract
A fixed effect production function model is adopted and estimated
in this paper for evaluating the agricultural policies of the
Soviet planners in Russia (formerly RSFSR) and Kazakhstan from 1953
to 1980. In particular, the functional form allows the variance of
output to increase or decrease as one input is increased.
Our estimates suggest the following assessment of the Soviet
planners' agricultural policies during the command economy days:
First, the extension of farming in Kazakhstan with generally
inferior soils and climate resulted in lower crop levels (with
identical input applications). Second, the massive inflow of
capital resources and sharp rise in fertilizer use in agriculture
during the Brezhnev years (1964-1982) did not contribute
significantly to crop levels in the two republics. Finally, the
extension of the cultivated area into marginal lands generally, and
of fertilizer use in wrong mix and form contributed to the
instability of agricultural output.
In conclusion, we emphasize the need for specifying and estimating
appropriate models for evaluating Soviet agricultural policies
especially because farm-level data are rapidly becoming available













The increasing availability of firm and farm level data in
Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union is
contributing to scholarly research in several directions. In
particular, the use of the production function as a microeconomic
tool of empirical analysis with the aim of drawing policy
conclusions in specific activities is much in evidence.
Thus, Danilin, Materov, Rosefielde and Lovell (1984) estimate
technical efficiency in Soviet cotton refining from a 1974 sample
of 151 enterprises and conclude that its production efficiency is
high in relation to the estimated stochastic frontier, and exhibits
little inter-enterprise dispersion. Johnson et al. (1994) employ a
similar stochastic frontier analysis to data for 11,400 farms for
six years (from 1986 to 1991) and provide measures of technical
efficiency and its inter-farm variation. Both studies draw on
current estimation procedures and extend them to increasingly
complex functional specifications. At the same time, they speculate
on the impact of Soviet planning procedures and managerial
incentive systems on the performance, as indicated by their
estimates, of the relevant activity.
These pioneering studies herald the liberation of planned
economy empirical research from its early efforts constrained by
the paucity of data, and their availability by industrial branches
and sectors of economy. The use of large, microeconomic data set
for econometric estimation with continuing refinements in the
functional form and estimation procedures makes the estimates
credible. When these are employed for explaining the role of the
planners in influencing the performance of this or that activity,
the exercise comes closer to being authentic. As these economies
move to free markets, the initial studies can also provide a
meaningful anchor for contrasting the performance of the original
production units (in the panel data set) with their fortunes at a
future date.
While such data are becoming increasingly available for post-
Soviet agriculture, the critical issue consists in linking the
proposed analysis with the available, state-of-the-art scientific
work. The important contributions of Anderson, Buccola, Griffiths,
Just, McCarl and Pope provide the necessary foundations from two
perspectives.
First, the production function must be defined such that it
captures the peculiarity of agricultural activity. In the standard
production function with the multiplicative error term, the
marginal risk defined as the partial derivative of the variance of
output with respect to a given input is positive for all inputs.1
This implies that the reduction at the margin of, say, pesticide
use will reduce crop variability whereas actually it might raise
such variability. Therefore, the functional form must permit the
variance of output to increase or decrease as one input is
increased. Following Just and Pope (1978, 1979), and Griffiths and
Anderson (1982), it can be stated as follows:
k «. k fl.
Q = f ( X ) + h ( X ) € = T T X 1 + € T T X 1 (1)
where Q is the level of output, X^ is the level o-f the ith
input and € is a stochastic error term with zero mean and
variance of" <r^ .
I For a rigorous proof, see Just and Pope (1979, p. 277) .
This more general formulation permits greater analytical
flexibility with respect to the effect of an input on mean farm
output and its variance.2
Second, Griffiths and Anderson (1982) suggest that time series
data may be needed to estimate /V s in equation (1) since in a
cross-section series, much of the variation in output "...can be
attributed to weather variation and if the increased use of some
inputs is to have mitigating effect on output variation,
observations over time are likely to be needed to capture this
effect." (p. 529). On the other hand, cross-section data are
necessary, in their view, to estimateoc/s in equation (1) because
input levels in a farm may not vary significantly over time to
allow estimation ofcC/s. Therefore, they recommend the pooling
of cross-section and time-series data to estimate equation (1).
However, appropriate statistical tests must be undertaken to
justify such pooling.
Additionally, the model in (1) , which is nonlinear and
includes the stochastic function h(X)€ can be specified in
various ways.
Therefore, in Section I, we state our model and discuss the
statistical tests necessary for accepting the parametric estimates.
The sequence of steps for estimating the model is stated in Section
However, the residual h(Xt, ft )£t is generally
heteroscedastic and therefore creates problems about
hypothesis testing and the statistical properties of the
estimates of °C. and /3t. Despite the presence of
heteroscedasticity, the ordinary least squares (OLS) and
nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimates of eCj are
unbiased and consistent; however, they are asymptotically
inefficient. (Buccola and McCarl, 1986, p. 732.)
II. In Section III, we present some estimates for the two republics
of RSFSR (currently Russia) and Kazakhstan based on our (fixed
effect) specification. In conclusion, we interprete our results and
link them to the decisions implemented by Soviet planners in the
command economy days. In particular, our estimates suggest that
while increased fertilizer use raised mean agricultural output
modestly, it increased its variance.3 In conclusion, we emphasize
that the policies of planners in Soviet agriculture cannot be
assessed properly without incorporating the special features of
farming in the model. More so as detailed, farm-level information
becomes available.
I. The Model and the Required Statistical Tests
The fixed effect model (alternatively known as the covarinace
model) adopted by us is stated as follows:
. N T K *k K #kQit = <X+ Z eiZit+ 2 *tWit> IT Xkit + €it TT Xkit (2)
1— C. t— C. K—1 K=l
where
Zj t = 1 for the ith cross-sectional unit
= 0 otherwise (i=2,3...N)
Wit = 1 "f°r t n G * t h time period
= 0 otherwise (t=2,3 T)
$i measures the unit-specific effect
and S^. measures the time—specific effect
E(€it) = 0, Var <€it> * <r2 and Cov (€it,€jt)=0 for i = j
3
 In a pathbreaking study of Indian foodgrain production,
Mehra (1981) showed that the improved seed/fertilizer-
based technologies (beginning from the mid-1960s) raised
grain yields but increased their instability compared to
the earlier years.
Note that in this fixed effect model, the dummy variables Zit and Wit
are included to allow for, say, differences in soil quality in the
two republics and of weather over time.4
What are the implications of this procedure? Suppose we adopt
a dummy of 1 for soil quality in the RSFSR and 0 in Kazakhstan.5
The soil quality of the RSFSR agricultural belt is a mixture of the
chernozem (black), forest-steppe and steppe soils.6 On average, the
soils in Kazakhstan are inferior with a combination of steppe and
semi-desert soils. The adoption of the dummies here implies that
It must be emphasized that soil quality is mentioned here
as an illustrative feature distinguishing one republic
from the other. Another distinguishing element can be the
extent of irrigation facilities. The relative breakdown
of farms in collective (kolkhoz) and state (sovkhoz)
types with differing incentives to farm workers is yet
another aspect.
Again, these features can be measured in the unit-
specific effect for a set of farms when they are pooled
together according to a distinguishing characteristic
such as a soil zone.
Instead of the 0-1 dummies, one can devise soil indexes
for the republics (or for a group of farms in a given
soil zone) based on a detailed mapping of soil types in
their agricultural belts. Such an index will reflect
soil differences in a republic (or the selected farms) in
relation to average soil. It is also possible to
construct an irrigation index reflecting the availability
of irrigation water in a republic (or in a set of farms) .
Similarly, time series of weather indexes can be
constructed for a republic (or farms in a climate zone)
on the basis of weather data used by Desai (1986).
For a discussion of the variety of soils in the Soviet
agricultural belt, see Desai (1986, Chapter 3).
the soil differences in the two republics and their impact on
output are nonrandom.7
In any case, it is necessary to test if there are systematic
differences between the two republics with respect to, say, soil
quality and other features, or weather, or both. For this purpose,
it is necessary to apply appropriate tests.
Statistical Tests:
Suppose we want to establish in our fixed effect model that
there are no systematic differences of soil quality and weather
(from year to year) between the two republics. For this purpose, we
must test the null hypothesis that 0; = 0, St = 0. Additionally, we
must test the hypothesis that the coefficients ock are identical for
each republic in order to justify the pooling of the time-series
and cross-section data. The detailed steps of applying these tests
for the fixed effect model are stated in the Appendix.
II. Estimation Methodology
The procedure for estimating the fixed effect model is
essentially similar to those for estimating the random effect model
By contrast, in the random effect model (discussed
extensively by Just and Pope, and Anderson and Griffiths)
the likely magnitude of the impact of republic-specific
feature such as soil quality is included in the error
term and is random.
Among the statistical differences of the two models, note
that the fixed effect model adopted by us sacrifices many
degrees of freedom whereas the random effect
specification saves degrees of freedom and the estimators
are, therefore, likely to be efficient. On the other
hand, its major limitation is that if the omitted
variables, such as soil quality and weather, are related
to the explicitly specified inputs on the right hand side
of the equation, the estimated coefficients can be biased
and inconsistent implying a misspecification.
developed by Just and Pope (1979) and further refined by Griffiths
and Anderson (1982). We state the sequence of steps for our fixed
effect model because we have employed the first two steps for
deriving the results reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Step 1. Run a nonlinear regression on the first part of
K #k




Step 5. Regress the residuals on the inputs as follows
2<Skln(Xkit) + € i t
Step 3. Compute K
k=l
and transform equation < 2)
in
by dividing both sides by h^t. Run again a nonlinear
regression as in step 1 to obtain X, 6^, 6'^ and ock ?s
equation (2) .
§tep__£t. iterate the above steps two or three times to
obtain e-fficient estimators of <xk*s. In this connection, the
discussion in Buccola and McCarl <19S6) regarding the small
sample properties of an estimator and suitable correction of
£r in step 2 is relevant.
III. Data and Estimates
Production function data for the two republics from 1953 to
1980 are put together from official statistical handbooks. The
output refers to ruble value of agricultural output (in billion
1970 rubles); the inputs include land (in million sown hectares),
capital stock (in constant 1973 prices), labor (in million
manhours) and fertilizers (in million metric tons). We found i t
difficult to update the series in view of the nonavailability of
republic handbooks for recent years.
In Tables 1 and 2, we present the estimates of oC '^s and p£s for the
two republics of RSFSR and Kazakhstan resulting fran an estimation of equation
(2) which is specified as Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale with pooled

















































































































































































































































Notes to Tables i and 2
1. The estimates in rows <1) and (2) of Table i are
derived by fitting equation (2*), and in rows <3) and
(4) by fitting equation (2") with pooled data for the
two republics of Kazakhstan and RSFSR. However, as
stated in the text* €»g is constrained to be zero in row
(3) and is estimated iv» row (4). The estimates of
Table 2 are derived by fitting the equation in step 2
on page 7 . The equations in Table 1 are nonlinear
whereas in Table 2? they are specified in double—log
formulation- Furthermore? the dependent variables in
the equations of rows (1?) and (2*) are the (natural)
log of the absolute values of the error terms estimated
from the equations in rows (1) and (2)? and the
explanatory variables are also in (natural) log.
Finally? the estimates in row (V) of Table 2 are
derived by pooling the data of the two republics- Here
the dependent variable is the (natural) log of the
absolute values of the error terms of the equation in
row
2. Values in parentheses are t values of the estimated
parameters. SER is the standard error of the
regression, LLF is the log of likelihood function? DW
is the Durbin—Watson statistic and R1- is (correlation
coefficient)^.
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carried out. In other words? we have not corrected for
heteroscedasticity to achieve efficient estimates- Also? the
statistical test with regard to the equality of ot^ 's
(k=l?2?3?4) across the republics in justification of pooling
the data for the two republics has not been performed. In
Table 1? S«^ f=l and in Table 2? (Sjf'sj as already stated? are
not constrained to be non—negative. Finally? the dummy
variables Wjj- representing time—related effects such as
year—to—year variations in weather are not included
111 the estimation. However? the dummy variable Z^t
representing republic-specific effect such as different soil
quality is incorporated. This implies that the equation for
estimating the parameters for Kazakhstan (specified as
republic 1) and RSFSR (specified as republic 2) in rows <1)
and (2) of Table 1 is:
K aki K ^ki
where i = l?S and k=l?2?3?^f Tor the four inputs? whereas the
specification for estimating the parameters for the pooled
data of the two republics in rows <3) and <^ > is:
. K ak K #k
a i t = iX+ e a z a t > " / k i t + € i t ' / k i t <2">
where i=l,2? k=l?2?3?4? and Z 2 t is the dummy of 1 for RSFSR
and 0 for Kazakhstan. However? note that in row (3) of the
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Table? &g=Q implying that- X is identical for the two
republics whereas in row (4), 0= is estimated which implies
that if A is the constant term for Kazakhstan? then the
constant term for RSFSR is
In row (2) of Table 1? the coefficients «^ . have
positive signs but in row <i>? the coefficient of fertilizer
is negative. The estimating equation for both is < 2 =• ) . When
the data for the two republics are pooled in row <3> and 8p
is constrained to be zero implying that the values of ot^ 's
and the constant term \ are equal for both the republics?
the estimates of the coefficients otj, change significantly
and the coefficient with respect, to capital becomes
negative- On the other hand? in row (4)? 0g is allowed to
vary. As a result? the standard error of the regression
falls? all the coefficients have expected signs? and most of
the coefficients and? in particular? 8g? are statistically
significant. In view of the statistically significant value
of Op? we reject the null hypothesis that Gg = 0 .
What do the results of row <4) in Table 1 imply? First?
the coefficient of (A+82) for RSFSR estimated at 1.0366
<0.6639 + 0.37S7) exceeds the corresponding term in
Kazakhstan with a value of 0.6639. This implies that? for
identical input levels? crop levels in RSFSR would be higher
than in Kazakhstan. This may result from say the superior
soils in RSFSR. Or perhaps in the RSFSR? relatively more
farms are organized along collective lines implying an ed«je
in farm incentives. "the dummy = - ? = * •
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with an estimated parameter of 0.3727 incorporates the
combined impact of several such features. Clearly, it is
important to separate these by employing properly—specified
indexes each incorporating these aspects for the republics.
Second* the • *" estimates suggest very small output
elasticities with respect to capital and fertilizers. If
these estimates are correct? a further application of
capital and fertilizers does not contribute significantly to
augmenting crop levels. (Note that the impact of these
inpubs on crop variabi1i ty is a separate issue and is
analyzed in terms of the estimates of <Sj, presented in Table
2> .
The estimates of ft^ °"r Table 2 are derived on the basis
of step 2 on page 7 . The estimated constant term here is
jSo. The results in row (4*) with the pooled data provide a
better fit than in rows (1) and (2). Most of the
coefficients are statistically significant. Also? the signs
of the coefficients &re in line with our expectations: the
variance in output increases with increases in the area
under cultivation and fertilizers? and the variance
decreases with increases in capital and labor.
The presumption here is that increased use of
fertilizers without matching applications of new seed
varieties? pesticides and water can raise crop
variability. For evidence in support of this argument
with respect to Soviet- graingrowing, see Desai (1937,
chapter 6).
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Our estimates throw light on the agricultural policies pursued
by the Soviet planners in RSFSR and Kazakhstan for almost three
decades ending in 1980.
First, the extension of farming in Kazakhstan with generally
inferior soils and climate resulted in lower crop levels (with
identical input applications).
Second, the massive inflow of capital resources and sharp rise
in fertilizer use in agriculture during the Brezhnev years (1964-
1982) did not contribute significantly to increased crop levels in
the two republics. Investments were channeled into agriculture,
without consideration of costs or returns, over wide-ranging
activities such as land drainage and reclamation, rural road-
building and provision of social infrastructure, increasing the
supplies of machines without regard to quality or spare parts, and
setting up agroindustrial complexes. By 1982, outlays in
agriculture had reached 27 percent of total investment in the
economy. At the same time, fertilizer use per kilogram of hectare
under grain had jumped sixfold from 8.9 kilograms in 1964 at the
start of the Brezhnev leadership to 54 kilograms in 1982.
Finally, the extension of the cultivated area into the
marginal lands generally, and fertilizer use in wrong mix and form
contributed to instability of agricultural output.
Even at the republic level, our results can be improved by
including suitable soil features and weather indexes. However, our
preliminary estimates mark a significant step in specifying and
estimating an appropriate model for evaluating Soviet agricultural
Details are in Desai (1987 p. 243, and 1992)
15
policies. These refinements are equally important when farm-level




METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Testing the Assumptions of the Fixed Effect Model
Testing the Null Hypothesis 6^=0
We estimate equation (2) with and without the
constraint. For example? the null hypothesis $2=O means that
the second republic (RSFSR) is not different from the first
(Kazakhstan) and a rejection of the null hypothesis implies
that RSFSR is diffrent from Kazakhstan.
We apply the likelihood ratio test to test the null
hypothesis. That is
LR = -2CL(o(,iT2> - L(«,LT 2)D -V X^
where L(«,ff2) is the log of likelihood function with the
constraint (i.e. &g=0) and L < « , cr'^) is the log of likelihood
function without the constraint. Similarly, the likelihood
ratio test can be used to test the null hypothesis <5"t=0 and
the equal i ty (between the republics) of the coefficients oc^,.
17
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